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NOTES
A Survey of the United States Treaties and Agreements'
Involving the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
INTRODUCTION
HAT AN ENERGY crisis stands on the horizon of every nation's
future is becoming increasingly apparent. The population of the
world is swelling.1 Living standards are rising, especially in the
developing states,2 resulting in increased per capita energy consump-
tion.3 Each nation must supply energy to a population which is both
expanding its numbers and increasing its individual requirements.
Energy needs, therefore, are simultaneously widening and deepening.
The most rapid energy growth over the past several years has oc-
curred in the use of electricity. 4 World electricity consumption is ex-
pected to increase to nearly seven times its 1970 level by the year
2000.- Most of this electric power will be generated by the use of either
fossil fuels or nuclear fisssion. 6 Other methods of producing power are
of course possible, such as solar, hydroelectric, tidal and geothermal
energy, windmills, and direct energy conversion (e.g., magnetohydro-
dynamics), but energy planners worldwide show very little inclination
to use these methods to any substantial degree in the near future.
Drawbacks such as high cost, inconvenient production sites, and the
embryonic stages of some of the technologies make the methods
uneconomic or impractical by present standards.
Fossil fuel is the predominant source of electric power today, but
supplies are decreasing. For example, conservative estimates predict
By the year 2000, world population will be at least 30% larger than it was in
1972, numbering more than 4.7 billion people. T. FREJKA, THE FUTURE OF POPULA-
TION GROWTH 55 (1973).
2 R. ASHER, DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN THE SEVENTIES 81-82 (1970).
1 There is a positive correlation between a nation's gross national product and
its per capita energy consumption. Thus economic progress is closely associated with
increased individual energy use. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, NUCLEAR
POWER AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1 (1973).
Id. at 1, 3.
1 The world electricity consumption was 4,900 x 109 kWh(e) in 1970. It is ex-
pected to soar to 3,360 x 1010 kWh(e) in 2000. Id. at 3.
6 Id. at 2.
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that the world's coal reserves will be exhausted by the year 2400. Oil
resources are expected to be exhausted by 2025.1 Thus, as the need for
electric power is soaring, fossil fuel supplies are dwindling, creating an
ever increasing gap which must be filled by another energy source. As
mentioned above, several energy alternatives are possible, but only one
alternative is being seriously considered by national energy planners
worldwide; nuclear energy.8
The United States is a major world producer of nuclear energy
technology. In early 1972 the United States' nuclear power capacity ac-
counted for nearly half of the total world capacity. 9 Canada, South
Africa and the United States have the largest known deposits of
uranium, the resource material used to make most nuclear fuel, ac-
counting for about eighty percent of the proved reserves of uranium
outside the Communist nations.' 0 Only the five states possessing
nuclear weapons (nuclear-weapon states) - China, France, the Soviet
Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States-have the
capability to convert uranium into nuclear fuel on a large scale."
Almost all nuclear power reactors built and planned in the United
States and the Soviet Union will use nuclear fuel made from uranium.
In the rest of the world, probably eighty percent of the total nuclear
fuel used will be made from uranium.' 2
By 1972, at least thirty-four nations were constructing or at least
planning to build nuclear power stations." This number jumped to
forty-one by 1976, and is expected to continue increasing.' 4 Although
several types of nuclear reactors have been designed to convert nuclear
fission energy into electricity, the United States produces only one
type, the light-water reactor, on a large scale. The light-water reactor
has been widely adopted worldwide."' Obviously, the United States will
I Id. at 3.
8 Nuclear fission is being enthusiastically promoted as a major energy source for
the future by energy planners worldwide. Smyth, The Need for International
Safeguards, in INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 3,4 (M. Willrich
ed. 1973).
9 Id. at 61.
" Willrich, Worldwide Nuclear Industry, in INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND
NUCLEAR INDUSTY 45, 62 (M. Willrich ed. 1973).
" Id. at 63.
" Id. at 62.
' Smyth, supra note 8, at 61.
14 Bauser, United States Nuclear Export Policy: Developing the Peaceful Atom as
a Commodity in International Trade, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 227, 229, 237 (1977).
1" Id. at 229.
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continue to be one of the major suppliers for increasing nuclear energy
requirements. 16
The Energy Research and Development Administration has, in
fact, projected that United States nuclear power export revenues will
range from three to four billion dollars in 1985, increasing to eight to
ten billion per year by 2000.1' Such exports are authorized by various
provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.18 In general, the Act
authorizes government- controlled commercial development of nuclear
power, both domestic and foreign, and allows international coopera-
tion in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
On first glance it appears that nuclear technology will offer an effi-
cient and profitable supply of electric power in the future, but closer
inspection reveals that nuclear power does not provide a simple answer
to the world's energy problems. The technology involves, generally,
three basic risks: (1) possible diversion of nuclear energy materials to
weapons manufacture, (2) economic pressures stemming from the de-
16 However, due to some technology lag and to recent policy changes, the United
States share of the nuclear energy market may not be so large in the future as was
predicted even a year ago. This development is discussed further in notes 19 and 22,
infra.
17 I U.S. ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, FINAL EN-
VIRONMENTAL STATEMENT ON U.S. NUCLEAR POWER EXPORT ACTIVITIES 3-91
(ERDA-1542, 1976). For the reasons mentioned in note 16 supra, these estimates are
probably now too high. With that caveat in mind, however, one can view them as a
general estimate.
Is 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976). Under § 123 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2153
(1976), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) may license the export of special
nuclear materials (e.g., enriched uranium) and production and utilization facilities
(e.g., enrichment facilities and light-water reactors) only under the auspices of an
agreement for cooperation between the United States and the country to receive the
materials, equipment or facilities. (These agreements for cooperation will be examined
further on in this note.) The President's approval and authorization of such an agree-
ment is always required. Depending upon the extent of cooperation intended, the
agreement must also lie before various Congressional committees for 30 days or before
the Congress for 60 days while Congress is in session before becoming effective.
Agreements requiring the 60 day waiting period may be rendered ineffective during
that time by a concurrent Congressional resolution. 42 U.S.C. § 2153(c)-(d) (1976).
For a discussion of the effects and possible abuses of such a law providing for
automatic Congressional approval after a certain period of inaction see Notes, U.S.
Military Exports and the Armed Export Control Act of 1976: The F-16 Sale to Iran, 9
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 407, 413-21(1977). For a more thorough discussion of the
provisions of the Atomic Energy Act relating to foreign exports see Bauser, supra note
14, at 230-33.
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mand for nuclear materials, equipment and technology, and (3) en-
vironmental risks, primarily from possible radiation leaks from the
reactors and from materials being transported or stored.
If the United States possessed a worldwide monopoly or near
monopoly of nuclear trade, then this nation could control these risks
by controlling the industry. However, such a situation does not exist
today. While it is true that the United States is and will continue to be
a major supplier of nuclear energy, its share of the world market is
nevertheless decreasing.' 9 This is due to three factors: (1) other coun-
tries have increased their nuclear energy exporting capabilities, thus
making the market more competitive than before,20 (2) the United
States' three enrichment plants (which perform the most complex step
in converting uranium into fuel) are presently operating at capacity,
thereby precluding future increases in fuel production and exportation
unless present enrichment capabilities are significantly expanded,2 '
and (3) the Carter administration, in an effort to deter the develop-
ment of nuclear weapons in foreign countries, has deferred indefinitely
the exportation of reprocessing and enrichment facilities and the com-
mercial use of breeder reactors,2 2 which many countries are interested
in acquiring."
19 The United States controlled almost 80% of the reactor export market from
1956 to 1973. During 1974 and 1975, however, the United States only exported 13 out
of 24 reactors exported worldwide, thus dropping to slightly over 50% of the market.
Bauser, supra note 14, at 238.
20 Id. at 238-39.
21 Id. at 239. Such expansion is planned in the near future under the Carter ad-
ministration's nuclear energy policy. See President Carter Announces Decisions on
Nuclear Power Policy, 76 DEPT STATE BULL. 429, 430 (1977).
22 Reprocessing and enrichment plants and breeder reactors involve the greatest
danger of nuclear materials diversions to weapons manufacture. This will be further
discussed in the next section of this note. President Carter outlined current United
States policy regarding nuclear energy exports in a statement issued April 7, 1977,
President Carter Announces Decisions on Nuclear Power Policy, supra note 21, at 429.
In that statement the President announced a decision to cut off funding and "[f]ederal
encouragement" for the reprocessing plant being built at Barnwell, South Carolina.
Id. He also promised a continued embargo on the export of uranium enrichment
technology, id. at 430, and deferral of the commercial use of breeder reactors. Id. at
429. The President stressed that other policy decisions were designed to counter the
negative effects of these decisions on the United States market share. These include a
significant increase in production capacity for enriched uranium, and proposed legisla-
tion to permit the United States to guarantee delivery of nuclear fuel to other countries
under supply contracts. Id. at 430.
21 Nye, Planning A Safeguardable Nuclear Future, 77 DEPT STATE BULL. 183,
188 (1977).
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The nuclear energy market, then, is highly competitive and is
supplied by many nations. Joseph Nye, Jr., Deputy to the Under
Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology has stated
that "it's too late for any one nation to dictate, but it's not too late to
cooperate."'2 United States control over the international nuclear
energy situation, therefore, depends upon United States cooperation
with other nations. Such cooperation is best exemplified by the United
States treaties and agreements which are now in effect. This note will
examine those treaties and agreements under which the United States
is cooperating with other nations to control the peaceful use of nuclear
energy.
I. NUCLEAR ENERGY TECHNOLOGY
Before examining the United States treaties and agreements which
involve nuclear energy, it will be helpful to first study the nuclear fuel
cycle itself. The range of potential problems associated with nuclear
energy and their possible solutions will also be discussed. Against this
technical and practical backdrop, the treaties and agreements can be
meaningfully scrutinized to determine how far they extend over the
range of problems which plague nuclear energy use and how well they
confront those problems.
A. The Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Uranium ore is mined, milled, enriched, and then made into fuel.
The fuel is irradiated in a reactor and the resulting atomic fissions
release heat which is converted into electricity. Used fuel (spent fuel) is
then either stored or reprocessed. If it is reprocessed, usable materials
are separated out and recycled, and the rest of the used fuel (wastes)
are stored. This, in simplified form, is the nuclear fuel cycle.
The light-water reactor (LWR) usually uses fuel derived from the
element uranium. 25 Natural uranium occurs in a number of different
isotopes.2 6 The most abundant isotope is uranium-238,2 7 which alone is
not useful for nuclear energy purposes. Another isotope, uranium-235,
;4 Nuclear Power Without Nuclear Proliferation, 77 DEFT STATE BULL. 666, 671
(1977).
'" United States reactors presently use only uranium fuel. Nye, supra note 23, at
185.
2' When an element occurs in isotopes, this means that there are two or more
types of atoms of that element. All these atoms have the same number of protons in
the nucleus and the same electron configuration, and therefore display basically the
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is needed to produce a fission chain reaction in a reactor.
Uranium-235 constitutes less that one percent of natural uranium. 28
Consequently, after natural uranium is mined, some of the uranium-
238 isotope must be removed to increase the proportion of the fission-
able uranium-235. This process of removing some of the uranium-238
isotope is called enrichment. LWRs require uranium enriched to at
least three percent uranium-235. 29 Uranium enrichment is the most
'complex and costly step in the nuclear fuel cycle.3 0
The enrichment process produces uranium oxide powder. This
powder is taken to a fuel fabrication plant, where it is pressed into
pellets and loaded into thin-walled metal tubing.3' The resulting fuel
elements are transported to a nuclear power plant where they are load-
ed into the reactor core.
There are two kinds of LWR; the pressurized water reactor (PWR)
and the boiling water reactor (BWR). In both types of LWR, the
uranium fuel is bombarded with slow neutrons which cause
uranium-235 atoms to fission. A nuclear fission releases energy in the
form of heat, and also causes two or three neutrons from the split
atom's nucleus to break away. The emitted neutrons may be absorbed
by other uranium-235 atoms, causing them to fission and creating a
sustained nuclear chain reaction. 2 The chain reaction generates a
tremendous amount of heat which ultimately, through one type of
thermal/kinetic energy conversion or another, creates steam. As in
conventional fossil fuel plants, the steam drives large turbines that
generate electricity. At the same time that this chain reaction is taking
place, some of the emitted neutrons are absorbed in atoms of
uranium-238, forming plutonium."3
same chemical properties. But the number of neutrons in the nuclei differ. The dif-
ferent isotopes may have different nuclear properties, as is the case with the uranium
isotopes. M. WILLRICH & T. TAYLOR, NUCLEAR THEFT: RISKS AND SAFEGUARDS 11 n.6
(1974).
" Natural uranium is 99.3% uranium-238. Willrich, supra note 10, at 47.
26 Only 0.7% of natural uranium is uranium-235. Id. at 48.
" Nye, supra note 23, at 185.
so Willrich, supra note 10, at 50. For a detailed description of the process of
enrichment, see id. at 50-52.
3, Id. at 53.
31 Id. at 47.
" When an atom of uranium-238 captures a neutron released in the fission pro-
cess, uranium-239 is formed. This radioactively decays, with a half-life of twenty
minutes, to neptunium-239. This atom subsequently decays, with a half-life of about
two days, to form plutonium-239. This isotope of plutonium has a half-life of 24,000
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The high-temperature, gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) is also in use or
under consideration for future use in some countries. This reactor uses
highly enriched uranium, i.e., uranium in which the proportion of
uranium-235 exceeds ninety percent, together with thorium for fuel.
The uranium undergoes a chain reaction as in the LWR while thorium
atoms capture some neutrons and are converted to uranium-233.5 4
The fast breeder reactor is under intensive development in at least
five other countries.3  This reactor uses either highly enriched
uranium, or plutonium, which is also fissionable, or both as the fuel
core. The core is surrounded by a layer of uranium-238 which is con-
verted during reactor operation into plutonium. 36 The end result is
that electric power and new fissionable material, plutonium, are
generated simultaneously." This reactor type is especially appealing to
countries lacking uranium resources or enrichment facilities.
After nuclear fuel is spent, it is removed from the reactor and
either stored or chemically reprocessed. At this point it is extremely
radioactive." If the fuel is reprocessed, uranium and plutonium are
separated out for reuse and the remaining highly radioactive wastes are
concentrated and stored.3 9
years. A half-life is the average time required for half of a given quantity of an
isotope to decay and form some other isotope. M. WILLRICH & T. TAYLOR, supra note
26, at 12. The time required for all of a given material to decay is not equal to twice
its half-life, it should be noted. For example, the time required for all of a given
amount of plutonium-239 to decay is 250,000 years.
When the irradiated, or spent fuel is removed from the reactor, it typically con-
tains about one atom of plutonium for every four uranium-235 atoms that were fissioned.
In an LWR plant which uses slightly enriched uranium (uranium with less than
10% uranium-235) and which steadily produces 1,000 megawatts of electrical power,
this translates to about 250 kilograms of plutonium produced per year, of which 200 to
225 kilograms are plutonium-239. The other 25 to 50 kilograms are mostly plutonium
240. Id. at 32. Natural uranium reactors would produce twice this amount of
plutonium. Willrich, supra note 10, at 54.
14 Willrich, supra note 10, at 49.
" Nye, supra note 23.
s This conversion takes place by the process described in note 33, supra.
Although it appears in this cursory examination that LWRs and fast breeder
reactors produce the same results, the fast breeder reactors actually yield much greater
amounts of fissionable materials, due to technical differences not developed here, than
do LWRs. The yield from a fast breeder reactor, in fact, can exceed the amount con-
sumed. Willrich, supra note 10, at 49.
3a Willrich, supra note 10, at 53.
" See Appendix A for a flowchart of the nuclear fuel cycle.
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B. Potential Problems Involved With Nuclear Energy
The nuclear energy problem most often discussed by politicians
and diplomats today is the possible diversion of nuclear energy
materials to weapons manufacture. 40 Plutonium produced in LWRs
and fast breeder reactors, and uranium-233 produced in HTGRs, once
isolated by reprocessing, can be used to make a fission bomb. 4'
Plutonium, which can be used as fuel in LWRs or fast breeder reac-
tors, and highly enriched uranium, used as fuel in fast breeder reac-
tors and HTGRs, also can be used for fission bombs. 42 Enrichment
facilities can be used to produce uranium enriched to more than ten
percent uranium-235, the minimum enrichment required for bomb
material.4s
An explosion from a nuclear bomb not only would produce
damage with a blast wave and heat, but also would release potentially
lethal penetrating radiation (prompt radiation) and radioactive
materials that could settle over a large area and cause further irradia-
tion. 44 Plutonium also can be used in a simple dispersal device to make
a lethal radiation weapon, as can the highly radioactive fission waste
products produced in all reactors. 45 Any government having enrich-
ment or reprocessing facilities or using plutonium or highly enriched
uranium for nuclear fuel would have access to these dangerous
41 See generally the 1977 volumes of the DEPT STATE BULL., in which the ma-
jority of press releases and discussions concerning nuclear energy problems center
around possible diversion of materials to weapons manufacture.
41 M. WILLRICH & T. TAYLOR, supra note 26, at 15, 19.
4 Id. at 18-19. It only takes about a dozen pounds of plutonium to make a
bomb with destructive capabilities similar to the one dropped on Nagasaki at the end
of World War II. Nye, supra note 23, at 186.
41 M. WILLRICH & T. TAYLOR, supra note 26, at 16.
44 Id. at 22.
,' Radioactive substances emit either alpha or beta particles or gamma rays when
they decay. These emissions are highly toxic because they damage somatic and
reproductive cells, causing cancer and other diseases and genetic defects. NUCLEAR
POWER AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 3, at 10. Plutonium emits alpha particles
which have very little penetrating power, so exposure to the skin is not very harmful.
But once plutonium is suspended in the air in very small particles, it is one of the most
toxic substances known. A few thousandths of a gram of such particles (about the size
of a pinhead), if inhaled, can cause death from fibrosis of the lungs within a few
weeks. Fission products emit highly penetrating gamma rays and therefore are ex-
tremely hazardous if dispersed, whether inhaled or not. A dispersal device would likely
be made from plutonium since plutonium is much safer to handle as long as it is not
inhaled or allowed to come into contact with broken skin. Id. at 13, 24-27.
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materials. Terrorist groups, too, could steal the materials to make the
bombs or dispersal devices described above."
The second major problem associated with nuclear energy is the
result of the technology's status as an important commodity in interna-
tional trade. The competitive atmosphere of the nuclear energy market
has exerted economic pressures upon the development and use of
nuclear technology. 47 Nations which have source material or nuclear
technology capabilities are competing vigorously for shares of the ex-
port market." Consequently, these countries must participate skillfully
in the economic juggling act of supply and demand. Each nation's
market survival depends upon world demand for the materials and
equipment which the nation can produce. And each nation's supply
capabilities must be maintained and constantly improved.
These economic problems, it should be noted, are closely inter-
woven with the weapons-potential problems previously discussed. The
increasing worldwide dependence upon nuclear energy has created an
intensely competitive market, in which every sort of nuclear material,
facility and equipment is in demand. Materials and facilities of
weapons-producing capability can only be kept out of use if attractive
alternatives are efficiently and relatively inexpensively supplied.
The third problem associated with nuclear energy is the danger of
environmental harm. A major hazard of nuclear energy use is the
danger of radiation contamination. Several stages of the nuclear fuel
cycle involve radioactive material. A typical large reactor, for example,
may contain about one and one-half tons of irradiated material in the
reactor core after several months of plant operation.4 9 About one-fifth
of this is gaseous or volatile.10 The reactor core is surrounded by a
cooling system which draws off the heat created by the chain fission
reaction. If this cooling system were to fail, the chain reaction would
continue producing heat, and ultimately the fuel rods and the material
surrounding the fuel would melt (core meltdown), exposing the
radioactive fuel material. A core meltdown potentially could release
this material into the surrounding environment.
46 For a fuller discussion of the risks of nuclear materials theft, see M. WILLRICH
& T. TAYLOR, supra note 26, at 107-21.
41 Bauser, supra note 14, at 229-30, 237-41.
48 Id.
49 UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, THE RISKS OF NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS 1
(R. Hubbard & G. Minor eds. 1977).
50 Id.
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Spent fuel is highly radioactive and very dangerous to handle
without heavy shielding. When it is removed from the reactor core
(unloaded), it is stored for several months in a concrete-lined water
pool next to the reactor while some of the radioactive material decays
to safe isotopes. An accidental break in the lining of the pool would
allow radioactive emissions from this stored fuel to reach the surround-
ing environment.
After the initial storage at the plant site, spent fuel must be
transported to a reprocessing plant or storage facility. The material is
put into thick-walled containers and transported by truck or train. A
simple negligent accident such as a collision or jackknife, especially if
an explosion resulted, could cause the containers to spill and break,
releasing material which would irradiate heavily travelled and possibly
heavily populated areas.
At the reprocessing plant the fuel again is stored in a concrete-
lined water pool for about five months to allow further radioactive
decay of some of the material. Then the fuel is either transported as is
to a permanent storage site or is separated into uranium, plutonium,
and fission reaction wastes. Separated uranium is fairly safe to handle.
It contains a very low percentage of uranium-235 and can be re-
enriched and used as fuel. Separated plutonium is in solution and is
initially fairly safe to handle. It can be used as fuel without enrich-
ment."' If it is to be stored after separation, however, it must be sur-
rounded by concrete shielding to keep the level of penetrating radioac-
tivity from exceeding safe standards for long-term exposure.52 The re-
maining reaction wastes are highly radioactive and very dangerous to
handle, and must therefore be heavily shielded to prevent radiation of
the surrounding environment until they are no longer toxic, i.e.,
•radioactive. If spent fuel is not reprocessed, the original mixture of
uranium, plutonium and waste materials is stored until the radioactivi-
ty decreases to safe levels.
The only known "method" of radioactivity detoxification is the
passage of time, i.e., waiting for the material to decay to non-
radioactive isotopes.55 This one known "method" is no method of
51 At this point plutonium also can be diverted to weapons manufacture. The
plutonium can be precipitated out of the solution in a few relatively easy steps and
then used in a fission bomb or dispersal device.
52 Plutonium radioisotopes gradually build up, which emit the highly penetrating
gamma rays mentioned in note 45, supra.
"s Note, The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and Nuclear Power
Plant Licensing: Judicial Modification of Agency Rulemaking-Natural Resources
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detoxification at all. Further, the reaction waste products, if stored
alone after reprocessing require 600 to 1000 years to decay to safe
isotopes. If spent fuel is not reprocessed, the mixture of uranium,
plutonium, and wastes must be stored until the longest-lasting material
has decayed to safe isotopes. Plutonium takes the most time to decay,
requiring at least 250,000 years to become safe.
Since no detoxification method exists, radioactive waste materials
simply increase year by year as reactors continue to operate. It is
estimated that the United States will need at least 500,000 cubic feet
of storage space for fuel disposal by 2010.14 This amount of disposed
fuel would fill more than a mile-long stretch of sixty-foot boxcars.
When one considers that this material must not only be contained but
must be heavily shielded with materials whose endurance has been
tested for only a few hundred years, one can only conclude that the
danger of leakage and environmental harm is immense. Moreover,
even if the container materials might last for the requisite 250,000
years, natural hazards may cause them to break and release their con-
tents. For example, geologists predict that there will be another ice age
in about 90,000 years, with glaciers moving over the northern half of
the globe."s The glaciers would of course gouge the land and cause
movements of land masses. Containers of radioactive material stored in
caves, salt beds and other natural land formations, if not extracted
and moved to new locations, would almost certainly be broken open.
Nuclear energy, then, involves the danger of radioactive con-
tamination during several steps of the nuclear fuel cycle. And when
the cycle is completed, a highly toxic end product remains which must
be isolated for such a long time that no government can effectively
plan for its safe storage during the time that the material remains
lethal. 5 6
Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 26 DEPAUL L. REV. 666,
666 n.5 (1977).
14 Id. at 667 n.7. Even this alarming estimate may be too low, since the Carter
administration has very recently decided to indefinitely defer the reprocessing and
recycling of plutonium within the United States so that it will be unavailable in
isolated form. President Carter Announces Decisions on Nuclear Power Policy, supra
note 22, at 429. All of the spent fuel from United States power plants, rather than just
the waste material alone must now be stored, increasing the previously estimated
storage space requirements.
" Calder, Head South With all Deliberate Speed: Ice May Return in a Few
Thousand Years, SMITHSONIAN, Jan. 1978, at 32, 37, 40.
10 All of these environmental risks were studied by the NRC and evaluated in
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, REACTOR SAFETY STUDY (NUREG-75/014,
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C. Possible Solutions To The Problems
What are the possible solutions to these various problems of
nuclear energy use?
The problem of the possible use of nuclear technology for weapons
manufacture can be approached in several ways. Countries using
nuclear energy could submit to a central system of control, using only
the materials and facilities allowed them by a central administrative
body. If the central body performed enrichment, reprocessing and
storage activities, dangerous materials and facilities would be removed
from any single country's internal control and possible misuse. Ter-
rorists too would have fewer opportunities to sabotage facilities or steal
materials.
Another possible solution would be to have the central body func-
tion as a monitor, inspecting nation-owned facilities and materials to
detect diversion of weapons-usable materials, reporting such diversion
to other concerned nations. Or nations could perform monitoring
functions among themselves. Countries could also exchange promises
not to divert nuclear energy materials or facilities to weapons manufac-
ture, or they could agree to make nuclear weapons capabilities
available to all nations, creating a heavily armed system of military
counterbalances. Nations could also enter into agreements to employ
1975) [hereinafter cited as RSS]. The RSS concluded that the probability of these risks
was so low as to be negligible. However, an independent group of scientists, engineers,
and mathematicians subsequently performed an analytical study of the RSS and the
50,000 pages of internal working papers which preceded the RSS. The results of this
study have been published in a 210-page book. THE RIsKS OF NUCLEAR POWER REAC.
TORS, supra note 49. This study revealed that several serious errors had been commit-
ted in the NRC's study. For example, the probability methods used by the NRC were
inappropriate for predicting the absolute probability of an event. Statistical theory was
misapplied, leading to systematic underestimates of the probabilities that were com-
puted. Much of the equipment reliability data necessary to such computations is presently
unavailable, incomplete or uncertain, which seriously detracts from the significance of
the probabilities computed. Id. at 132-33. The RSS also purposely avoided certain
safety issues because the officials involved feared that "the facts may not support our
pre-determined conclusions" and because it was "not known in advance" that the
results would "engender confidence" in the reliability of reactor safety systems. Id. at
6. Internal papers further revealed that the basic purpose of the RSS was to produce a
report that would have "significant benefit for the nuclear industry." Id. The RSS was
internally reviewed before its release. One of the reviewers called the accident pro-
bability findings "gibberish," and another reviewer said that some of the estimates
were "suspiciously low." Id.
Vol. 10:671
NUCLEAR ENERGY TREA TIES
protection systems in their nuclear energy facilities to prevent terrorist
attacks and thefts.
Economic pressures could be eased by agreements to deemphasize
competition in the nuclear energy market. For example, countries
possessing uranium deposits and nuclear technology (supplier nations)
could promise to satisfy the nuclear energy needs of recipient nations.
Under such a guarantee program, nations lacking natural uranium
deposits would not feel compelled to acquire nuclear power plants that
yield the highest production-consumption fuel ratio (e.g., breeder
reactors) in order to guarantee their future energy security. Supplier
nations also could agree among themselves that it is more important to
reduce the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities than it is to increase
sales. Under such an agreement, enrichment and reprocessing plants
and certain reactor types such as the HTGR and fast breeder reactor
could be removed from the market by all suppliers, completely
eliminating the competitive influence of materials and facilities of
weapons-producing capabilities. Nations also could agree to vigorously
develop other energy technologies (e.g., solar, geothermal, and
hydroelectric power) and to actively promote those technologies on the
energy market as attractive alternatives to nuclear energy.
The environmental problems posed by nuclear energy offer the
smallest hope of adequate solution. Nations cannot make agreements
among themselves that nuclear energy materials will not be toxic or
take hundreds of thousands of years to decay. Nations cannot make
agreements to detoxify wastes according to a certain procedure, since
detoxification is impossible. The only effective solution to the en-
vironmental danger problem is worldwide abandonment of the nuclear
industry itself, and substitution of other safer technologies. The aban-
donment of nuclear technology is an unlikely prospect, however. The
best that states can do if nuclear energy is to be used is to agree to ac-
tively develop safety systems and to submit to safety regulations based
upon those systems. They of course also can agree to practice energy
conservation to slow the production of radioactive waste materials,
although such action is not really a solution to the problem since it
acts merely to postpone, not eliminate the inevitable buildup of toxic
wastes7.5
" Liability agreements have not been mentioned here because they do not
provide solutions in the sense used in this note. Aside from having some possible
deterrent' effects, the payment of money to an injured party after the fact of injury
does not act as a solution to the problems leading to the injury.
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II. UNITED STATES TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS
RELATING To NUCLEAR ENERGY
As discussed earlier, the most effective way in which the United
States can control the international use of nuclear energy is to enter in-
to treaties and agreements with other countries and with international
bodies. Bo Johnson, Associate Professor of International Law at the
University of Stockholm, states that treaties and agreements are "of the
utmost importance to the shaping of international norms. They give
evidence of the opinion and expectation of states as to what should be
the law [and] may become part of the corpus of general international
law, thus becoming binding also on states not parties to a specific trea-
ty."' 8 Another author in the field of international agreements has
stated:
The role of treaties and, in fact, of international agreements as a
whole in international relations is constantly on the increase. Both
sovereign states and international organizations have found it
necessary to make constant resort to the conclusion of treaties and
other forms of international agreements as a means of developing
peaceful co-operation among themselves. 59
The United States international treaties and agreements relating to
peaceful uses of nuclear energy can be divided into two basic groups:
safeguards agreements,60 and research and technical information ex-
change agreements."' Representative treaties and agreements from
each of these groups will be examined to determine: (1) the purposes
of the agreements, (2) how those purposes are effected by specific pro-
visions, and (3) the ways in which the agreements are to be enforced.
A. Safeguards Agreements
Treaties and agreements concerning safeguards developed in three
stages. The United States originally supplied nuclear technology to
B. JOHNSON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 20 (1976).
Osakwe, The Concept and Forms of Treaties Concluded by International
Organizations, in AGREEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 165, 165 (K.
Zemanek ed. 1971).
s0 The term "safeguards" when used in the context of nuclear energy agreements
means a system of accountings and inspections under which the diversion of nuclear
materials can be detected.
5l Treaties banning nuclear weapons tests and prohibiting the emplacement of
nuclear weapons on the ocean floor are not included in this survey. Their purpose is
the same as that of the safeguards agreements; to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons. But they are not concerned with the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
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recipient countries under the auspices of bilateral agreements for
cooperation concerning civilian (i.e., peaceful) uses of atomic energy.
Later, many of these agreements were supplemented by trilateral
agreements between the United States, the recipient countries and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the application of
IAEA safeguards to the cooperation agreements. Finally, the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was signed by more
than 100 nations, including the United States. Several of the trilateral
agreements mentioned above were subsequently suspended and replaced
by trilateral agreements for the application of safeguards pursuant to
the NPT. 62
1. Agreements For Cooperation
The Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic
Energy (Cooperation Agreement), signed with Colombia on April 9,
1962,63 is representative of the United States agreements for coopera-
tion. The purposes of the Cooperation Agreement are to assist Colom-
bia's research and development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in-
cluding civilian nuclear power and medical therapy, and to safeguard
the supplied materials and technology against diversion to military
purposes." The Cooperation Agreement is grounded upon the premise
6t For a well-written and detailed treatment of the historical developments
leading up to the international safeguards agreements see Bechhoefer, Historical
Evolution of International Safeguards, in INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR
INDUSTRY 21 (M. Willrich ed. 1973). A simpler summary is offered in Nye, supra note
23, at 184-85, 188-89.
61 Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, Apr. 9,
1962, United States-Colombia, 14 U.S.T. 388, T.I.A.S. No. 5330; Amendment to
Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, Feb. 24, 1967,
United States-Colombia, 21 U.S.T. 1998, T.I.A.S. No. 6943; Agreement Continuing
the Agreement for Cooperation Concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, Mar. 28,
1977, United States-Colombia, T.I.A.S. No. 8555.
64 Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, supra
note 63, preamble. The purpose of the Cooperation Agreement has been deduced here
and in each subsequent agreement analysis by examining the statements made in the
preamble and elsewhere in the agreement following words and phrases such as
"whereas," "with the objective of," "considering," and "affirming the principle that."
This interpretive method is based upon the principles employed by the International
Court of Justice in interpreting treaties. The pertinent principles are that words should
be given their natural and ordinary meaning, consideration should be given to their
position within the treaty, and analysis should always be conducted within the context
of the treaty as an integrated whole. LORD McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIFS 364 n.1,
366-84, 393 (1961).
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that the peaceful use of nuclear energy "holds great promise for all
mankind." 65
Detailed provisions set forth the manner in which these purposes
are to be given effect. Under Article III of the Cooperation Agreement,
the two governments are to exchange information on reactors, nuclear
materials use, and health and safety problems related to the foregoing.
Paragraph A of Article IV allows the sale or lease of enriched
uranium to Colombia. Paragraph B of Article IV limits the quantity of
United States uranium which may be held by Colombia. The max-
imum quantity allowed is the amount necessary for the full loading of
each reactor project fueled by the uranium, plus the amount necessary
to permit the continuous operation of such reactors or reactor ex-
periments while replaced fuel is radioactively cooling, or in transit, or
being reprocessed. Reprocessing of any such material may be performed
only in United States facilities, or elsewhere under terms and condi-
tions acceptable to the United States, according to Paragraph D of Ar-
ticle IV. Paragraph F of that article allows Colombia to transfer
special nuclear material6 6 produced in United States-supplied fuel to a
third government only if the United States approves the transfer.
Article VII allows for the performance of the foregoing activities,
subject to the same limitations, by authorized persons67 under the
jurisdiction of either government.
The two governments "emphasize their common interest in assuring
that any material, equipment, or device made available to . . . Colom-
bia pursuant to this Agreement shall be used solely for civil purposes"
in Article VIII, Paragraph A. The United States is given the following
rights under Paragraph B of Article VIII: (1) the right to review the
design of reactors, equipment and devices either provided by the
United States or using materials provided by the United States to
assure that their design and operation is for non-military purposes, (2)
the right to require records and reports accounting for materials sup-
plied by the United States, or used in or produced by equipment and
65 Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, supra
note 63, preamble.
66 "Special nuclear material" is defined in Article I paragraph (j) of the Amend-
ment to Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, supra
note 63, as plutonium or enriched uranium.
67 A "person" is defined in Article I paragraph (f) of the Amendment to Agree-
ment for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, supra note 63, as an
individual, corporation, partnership, firm, association, trust, estate, public or private
institution, group, government agency, or government corporation.
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materials provided by the United States, (3) the right to require the
storage, in facilities designated by the United States, of special nuclear
materials (listed in (2) above) which are not otherwise used pursuant to
other articles of the Cooperation Agreement, (4) the right to inspect
the materials and facilities described in this Article, and (5) the right
to consult with Colombia on the matter of health and safety.
Colombia guarantees that no material, equipment or device
transferred pursuant to the Cooperation Agreement will be used "for
atomic weapons or for research on or development of atomic weapons
or for any other military purposes" in Article IX.
One article of the Cooperation Agreement specifically provides for
its enforcement by sanctions against its violation. Article VIII,
Paragraph B gives the United States the right to suspend or terminate
the Cooperation Agreement and require the return of any materials,
equipment and devices described in the Cooperation Agreement in the
event of noncompliance with the provisions of Article VIII or the
guarantees set forth in Article IX. In the event of a dispute over
whether the provisions have been violated, or the refusal of Colombia
to return the materials and equipment after an admitted violation,
either party has the right to bring suit before the International Court
of Justice (ICJ), as do all disputing states which are parties to the ICJ
Statute.6 8 Performance of the Cooperation Agreement is "subject to an
over-riding obligation of mutual good faith," as are all treaties, accor-
ding to general principles of international law.6 9
The agreements for cooperation, in general, further the basic
premise that peaceful nuclear energy use should be promoted. Concern
over the possible employment of nuclear technology for military pur-
poses is secondary to this promotion. Concern over environmental risks
is extremely slight, evidenced only by promises to exchange informa-
tion and consult on the subject. The inspection, reporting, and
reprocessing provisions of the agreements give the United States some
control over that portion of the nuclear industry which the United
States supplies. These cooperation agreements, it should be noted, re-
quire no promises and give the United States no control over the use of
60 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, Art. 35, 59 Stat.
1055, T.S. No. 993.
09 LoRD MCNAIR, supra note 64, at 465. "Treaties must be applied and inter-
preted against the background of the general principles of international law." Id. at
466. (Agreements, protocols, arrangements, conventions, etc. are all included in Lord
McNair's use of the word "treaty." Id. at 22-24.)
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nuclear technology which might be supplied by other countries. Sanc-
tions set forth in the cooperation agreements relate only to the military
use of nuclear technology, and not to violations of safety standards.
In the final analysis, cooperation agreements are business contracts
under which the United States sells a commodity-nuclear
technology-to another country, and supervises the use of the com-
modity to insure that it will not be diverted for military purposes.
2. Safeguards Agreements With The IAEA.
The IAEA was established in October 195770 by a treaty signed
eventually by 109 countries including the United States. This treaty is
called the Statute of the IAEA (Statute).7"
The purpose of the Statute is to establish an international body
that will "seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic
energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world."', In ad-
dition the IAEA is supposed to "ensure, so far as it is able, that
assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or
control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose."13
Article III, Paragraph A of the Statute authorizes various IAEA
functions designed to achieve the Statute's purposes. These functions
include: (1) encouraging and assisting the research and development of
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, (2) fostering the exchange of inform-
tion, and the exchange and training of scientists in the field of
peaceful nuclear energy uses, (3) providing for materials, services,
equipment and facilities to meet the needs of the peaceful uses of
atomic energy, including the production of electric power, and (4) ap-
plying safeguards and/or standards of safety to bilateral or multilateral
arrangements or to a state's internal activities in the field of atomic
energy, at the request of the parties involved. Under Article IX of the
Statute, members may make nuclear materials available to the IAEA,
and on request of the IAEA shall deliver such materials to another
member or group. The IAEA is to allocate these materials so as to
secure the greatest possible benefit in all areas of the world, especially
70 Bechhoefer, supra note 62, at 32.
" Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, opened for signature Oct.
26, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 1093, T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 3; Amendment to the
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, approved Oct. 4, 1961, 14 U.S.T.
135, T.I.A.S. No. 5284; Amendment to the Statute of the International Atomic
Energy Agency, approved Sept. 28, 1970, 24 U.S.T. 1637, T.I.A.S. No. 7668..
12 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, supra note 71, Art. II.
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in the underdeveloped areas, according to Article III, Paragraph B.
The first three functions listed above are internal IAEA activities
and therefore would not be "enforced" against a state. The fourth
function can be enforced only against a state which has voluntarily
submitted, in a separate agreement, to the application of IAEA
safeguards or safety standards. Thus, the Statute of the IAEA sets up a
framework for the enforcement of uniform safeguards and safety stan-
dards by an international body. That framework is not legally binding
on any state without a separate safeguards agreement. Under Article
XVII any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the
Statute not settled by negotiation shall be referred to the ICJ.
The IAEA Statute evidences worldwide consensus that the peaceful
use of nuclear energy should be promoted. As in the Cooperation
Agreement discussed above, concern with the possible military use of
nuclear technology is secondary to this promotion. The environmental
problems associated with nuclear energy are also of secondary concern,
although they are given more recognition than in the Cooperation
Agreement, since equal arrangements are made by the Statute for ap-
plying either safeguards or safety standards to nuclear energy uses.
The Cooperation Agreement with Colombia, discussed above, was
one of several agreements for cooperation later supplemented by
trilateral safeguards agreements with the IAEA.7 4
The purpose of the United States- Colombia- IAEA Safeguards
Agreement (Safeguards Agreement) is to substitute the IAEA's
safeguards system for the monitoring functions formerly performed by
the United States under Article VIII, Paragraph B of the Cooperation
Agreement. 75
Colombia promises in § 2 of the Safeguards Agreement that the
materials, equipment and facilities discussed above in the Cooperation
Agreement will not be used in such a way as to further any military
purpose. Under § 9(a), a list of these materials, equipment and
Agreement for the Application of Safeguards, Dec. 9, 1970, United States-
Columbia-IAEA, 21 U.S.T. 2677, T.I.A.S. No. 7010; Protocol for the Application of
Safeguards to the Cooperation Agreement, Mar. 28, 1977, United States-Columbia-
IAEA, T.I.A.S. No. 8556. Twenty such trilateral agreements have been signed with
the United States to date.
11 Agreement for the Application of Safeguards, supra note 74, preamble, §§ 4,
6. The IAEA's safeguards system is very similar to that examined in the Cooperation
Agreement. The IAEA safeguards system is set forth in IAEA Document GC (IX)/294,
reprinted in 4 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 512 (1965); and IAEA Document
GC(X)/INF/86, reprinted in 5 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 987 (1966).
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facilities is to be prepared by both governments and submitted jointly
to the IAEA as the "Inventory for Colombia." The IAEA agrees in § 4
to apply its safeguards system to the Inventory for Colombia. Under §
6, the United States monitoring functions under Article VIII of the
previous Cooperation Agreement are suspended. Colombia and the
United States agree in § 9(b) to notify the IAEA of any transfer to Col-
ombia under the Cooperation Agreement and any transfer to the
United States of any special fissionable materia7 6 listed in the Inven-
tory for Colombia. The IAEA is to send copies of the Inventory to
both governments, pursuant to § 10, at least every twelve months. Sec-
tion 11 sets forth specific details and time limits to be followed in noti-
fying the IAEA under § 9 of transfers of Inventory items. The govern-
ments agree in § 15 to notify the IAEA of any transfer of Inventory
items to a recipient country not under the jurisdiction of either state.
Such a transfer is allowed only if arrangements have been made for
IAEA safeguards after the transfer or if the items will be subject to
similar safeguards which the IAEA finds acceptable. Under § 25,
IAEA inspectors are granted such privileges and immunities as are
necessary for the exercise of their functions.
Enforcement provisions are contained in §§ 23 and 29. Under § 23,
if the IAEA determines any non-compliance with the Safeguards
Agreement, it shall "call upon the government to remedy such non-
compliance forthwith" and shall promptly notify the other government
and make any other reports that it deems appropriate." If the offend-
ing government fails to take fully corrective action within a reasonable
time, the IAEA is relieved of its safeguards functions and may direct
curtailment or suspension of any assistance being provided by the other
party to the agreement or by the IAEA and may call for the return of
materials and equipment made available to the offending state. The
IAEA may also deny to the noncomplying state the privileges and
rights of membership in the IAEA. If any dispute arising out of the in-
terpretation or application of the Safeguards Agreement is not settled
"Special fissionable material" is defined in Article XX of the Statute of the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency, supra note 71, as plutonium-239, uranium-233,
uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233, or any material containing any of the
foregoing.
11 Probably the IAEA would report the noncompliance to all IAEA members and
to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations, as provided for
in Article XII, Paragraph C of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agen-
cy, supra note 71.
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by negotiation or by any other agreed upon method, then § 29 pro-
vides that either government may request that the dispute be submit-
ted to an arbitral tribunal. That section provides that the decisions of
the tribunal "shall be binding on all Parties."
The safeguards agreements with the IAEA strengthen the ability of
the United States to guard against the non-peaceful use of United
States-supplied nuclear technology. This added strength is due to three
factors: (1) The agreements for applying safeguards are more detailed
than those contained in the cooperation agreements, and stand as
separate documents from the agreements to supply nuclear technology
to other nations. This arrangement removes the subject of safeguards
from its previously subordinate position in the agreements for coopera-
tion, and emphasizes its importance as the sole subject of separate bind-
ing agreements. (2) The administration of the safeguards system by a
third party, the IAEA, injects neutrality into the investigative and
decision-making process of monitoring nuclear energy use. This adds
credibility to any findings or accusations made by the IAEA and may
in turn foster quick compliance with IAEA demands to rectify viola-
tions of the agreements. (3) In the event of a dispute, either govern-
ment may request that an arbitral tribunal decide the outcome. Since
arbitration is almost always quicker and more efficient than are hear-
ings before the ICJ,11 gaps in the operation of the safeguards
agreements in the event of disputes will be shorter than under the
cooperation agreements. Further, the decision of an arbitral tribunal is
more likely to be accepted by the parties to the dispute than would a
decision of the ICJ, since the disputing parties choose the arbitrators at
the time of the dispute.7 9 The bench of the ICJ, of course, cannot be
chosen by the disputing parties.
It should be noted that no trilateral agreements have been entered
into with the IAEA for the application of safety standards to the
nuclear technology exported by the United States.
The trilateral agreements with the IAEA, then, contribute nothing
to the solution of the environmental problems associated with nuclear
energy use. The agreements add some strength to United States control
over the possible non-peaceful use of United States-supplied
technology. These agreements suffer from one major flaw: entrance in-
c8 Eubanks, International Arbitration in the Political Sphere, 26 ARB. J. 129,
129 (1971).
79 Agreement for the Application of Safeguards, supra note 74, § 29.
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to the agreements is voluntary. The United States cannot compel any
country already involved in a cooperation agreement to submit to the
more effective IAEA safeguards system.
3. Safeguards Agreements Pursuant To The NPT
The NPT has been signed by 102 nations to date. 80 Its purposes
are twofold: to prevent the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons by
facilitating the application of IAEA safeguards to peaceful nuclear ac-
tivities, and to make the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear
technology available to all NPT signatory states.
The preamble to the NPT and Article VI declare the parties' in-
tention to cease the nuclear arms race and begin nuclear disarmament
as soon as possible. Each nuclear-weapon state agrees in Article I not
to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to
manufacture nuclear weapons. Under Article II each non-nuclear-
weapon state agrees not to receive nuclear weapons or control over
nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly, and agrees not to manufacture
nuclear weapons or to seek or receive assistance in such manufacture.,
Each non-nuclear-weapon state agrees under Article III to submit all
of its nuclear energy activities to IAEA safeguards, by concluding
safeguards agreements with the IAEA. No nuclear technology will be
transferred to the states which are parties to the NPT except under
IAEA safeguards.
Under Article IV, all parties agree to participate in the fullest
possible exchange of peaceful nuclear energy technology. Parties with
nuclear capabilities also agree to cooperate in contributing to the
development of peaceful nuclear energy use, especially in the ter-
ritories of non-nuclear-weapon states, with due consideration for the
needs of the developing areas of the world.
Enforcement provisions are not specifically mentioned in the NPT.
Article X provides that each party has the right to withdraw from the
treaty if it decides that "extraordinary events . . . have jeopardized the
supreme interests of its country." Notice of withdrawal, including a
statement of the extraordinary events, must be given three months in
advance of the withdrawal. "Extraordinary events" are not defined in
the NPT.
10 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature Ju-
ly 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter cited as
NPT].
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Ten trilateral agreements have been entered into between the
United States, non-nuclear-weapon states and the IAEA pursuant to
the NPT. They do not differ significantly from the trilateral agree-
ments with the IAEA discussed above, and will not be further examined
here. 8'
The United States has also entered into a bilateral agreement with
the IAEA for the application of safeguards to domestic civilian ac-
tivities pursuant to the NPT.8 2 Such a treaty is allowed by Article III,
Paragraph A.5 of the IAEA Statute.8 3 The United States entered into
this bilateral agreement "for the purpose of encouraging widespread
adherence to the Treaty [NPT] by demonstrating to non-nuclear-
weapon States that they would not be placed at a commercial disad-
vantage by reason of the application of the safeguards pursuant to the
Treaty [NPT]." '84
Provisions of this bilateral agreement resemble those in the
safeguards agreements with the IAEA, discussed above, except that
facilities associated with activities "with direct national security
significance to the United States" are excluded from safeguard applica-
tions.85 This seems self-defeating; obviously the excluded facilities are
excluded precisely because they are engaged in nuclear weapons
manufacture or other military activities. However, by entering into this
agreement, the United States subjects its commercial facilities to the
same accounting and reporting requirements and inspection obliga-
tions to which non-nuclear-weapon states are subject under the NPT.
As noted above, this eliminates any economic disadvantage that might
otherwise befall a non-nuclear-weapon state because of adherence to
the NPT. The bilateral agreement safeguards provisions do at any rate
provide some supervision over United States use of nuclear energy.
Specifically, the United States cannot divert nuclear power plant
materials to augment present weapons capabilities without the IAEA
discovering the diversion.
Enforcement provisions under Articles 18 and 21 of the bilateral
"1 See, e.g., the Protocol for Application of Safeguards Pursuant to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, Apr. 14, 1975, United States-Sweden-IAEA, 26 U.S.T. 478,
T.I.A.S. No. 8049.
St News in Brief, 18 INT'L ATOM. ENERGY AGENCY BULL. 74, 76 (1976). For the
text of the agreement, see Draft Agreement for the Application of Safeguards in the
United States, 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 22 (1977).
63 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, supra note 71.
64 Draft Agreement for the Application of Safeguards in the United States, supra
note 82, at 25. (Preamble.)
11 Id. at 26. (Art. 1.)
1978
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
agreement are the same as those set forth in §§ 23 and 29 of the
Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA discussed previously.
The NPT represents a major step forward in controlling the prob-
lem of the possible diversion of nuclear technology to military uses.
Control of this diversion problem is the main purpose of the treaty. Con-
cern over development and supply of nuclear technology has become sec-
ondary. Non-nuclear weapon states which sign the NPT are thereafter
obligated to submit to IAEA safeguards. And the non-nuclear-weapon
states are induced to sign the NPT by the promises that nuclear-
weapon states will begin nuclear disarmament and supplier states will
undertake to provide signatory states with their nuclear energy needs.
In other words, the NPT presents to the non-nuclear-weapon states an
offer of nuclear energy security in exchange for some loss of military
security. This offer has proved sufficiently attractive to draw more
than 100 signers, many more than had voluntarily signed the IAEA
safeguards agreements, discussed above, with the United States. The
most progressive element of the NPT is the provision under which the
non-nuclear-weapon states agree to submit all of their nuclear energy
activities to IAEA safeguards, regardless of the origins of the materials
and facilities. Such an agreement allows for complete supervision of
the nuclear energy industry among those nations which have signed the
NPT, except in the five nations already possessing nuclear weapons.
The NPT also represents the first agreement in the area of peaceful
nuclear energy use in which nuclear-weapon-states agree to reduce
their nuclear weapon holdings in order to prevent the diversion of.
nuclear technology to military purposes in other states.
B. Research And Technical Information Exchange Agreements
The numerous agreements concerning research and technical infor-
mation exchanges are fairly simple. An example is the Agreement on
Reactor Safety Experiments (Safety Agreement), signed by eight na-
tions including the United States in 1975.86 According to Article II of
the Safety Agreement, its purpose is to establish a cooperative project
using a reactor for safety experiments concerning containment
response. Information is to be exchanged in reports under Article
VIII. Provisions relating to the right to withdraw, and arrangements
for termination in Articles XI and XII deal only with financial mat-
ters, presupposing the right to voluntarily withdraw. Article XV pro-
vides that disputes which are not settled through consultation shall be
" Agreement on Atomic Energy Reactor Safety Experiments, opened for
signature Jan. 24, 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8479.
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submitted to a Swedish court or, if a party so requests, to arbitration.
It should be mentioned here that agreements of the type discussed
in this section are regarded as international business transactions", and
therefore fall under the United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York
Convention). 8 One authority on the subject states:
The [New York C]onvention has introduced in every member
country fairly reliable guarantees for judicial recognition of the
agreements . . . to arbitrate abroad, and for enforcement of foreign
awards, at least when made in another member country. The [New
York C]onvention has been already adhered to by more than forty
nations .... 89
The New York Convention provides in Article I that signatory
states will recognize and enforce, under the rules of procedure in their
respective jurisdictions, foreign arbitral awards. Article III states that
each signatory state "shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and en-
force them .. "
Most of the technical exchange agreements state that their underly-
ing purpose is to improve and ensure the safety of reactors or nuclear
energy technology on an international basis90 and provide for the
exchange of letters, reports and other documents, visits and exchanges
of scientists, and collaboration in the development of certain pro-
grams.8 1 However, none of these agreements contain provisions requir-
8 "[A]greements on research, designing, building and assembly, technical
assistance . . . and so forth, are regarded as foreign trade transactions." Bratus, Ar-
bitration and International Economic Cooperation Towards Industrial, Scientific, and
Technical Development, 27 ARB. J. 230, 231 (1972). See also Lebedev, Developing Ef-
fective International Commercial Arbitration, 30 ARB. J. 59, 60 (1975).
81 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
done June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter cited as New York Convention]. Several
of the 45 signatory states made declarations and reservations when signing the New York
Convention, most of them limiting its effect to commercial arbitration awards, or to
awards made in the territory of states parties to the New York Convention. These are
reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS MULTILATERAL TREATIES 523 (1977).
The United States Arbitration Act was amended in 1970 to provide for the en-
forceability of foreign arbitration awards in the United States. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08
(1970).
1' Lebedev, supra note 87, at 62.
'0 See, e.g., the Preamble of the Agreement on the Power Burst Facility
Research Program, Feb. 25-Mar. 3, 1977, United States-Austria, T.I.A.S. No. 8685.
" See, e.g., Article 4, paragraphs (a)-(d) of the Arrangement for Technical In-
formation Exchange in Regulatory Matters, May 18-May 30, 1974, United States-Japan,
T.I.A.S. No. 8541.
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ing the application of safety standards to the nuclear industry based
upon the findings of the research. Moreover, almost all of the ar-
rangements provide for voluntary termination on thirty days' to six
months' notice. 92 This means that if any sort of dispute arises, a state
may simply give notice and withdraw after the predesignated time
period elapses. Other states in that event have no power to force a
state to adhere to the agreement beyond the notice period.
The research and information exchange agreements create little
more than slightly binding business arrangements for collaboration on
research projects. Since the agreements do not contain provisions for
the application of safety standards to the nuclear industry, and since
parties can voluntarily withdraw from them, the agreements can exert
little force upon the solution of any of the problems with nuclear
energy.
The United States is a party to an international agreement which
falls into neither of the above two groups but which has some bearing
on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This is the U.N. adoption (by
resolutions) of the Declaration of The United Nations Conference on
the Human Environment (Declaration). 9 In Resolution 3003, the U.N.
states that one main purpose of the Conference was to increase the
awareness among governments and public opinion of the importance
and urgency of the problems of the environment.9 4
Resolution 2994 states that the international community has a
responsibility to take action to preserve and enhance the environment,
and draws the member governments' attention to the Declaration and
to the recommendations for action at the national level which were
made by the Conference.9" Resolution 2995 says that in the explora-
tion, exploitation and development of their natural resources, states
must not produce significant harmful effects in zones situated outside
their national jurisdictions. 96
92 See, e.g., Article II, paragraph (h) of the Arrangement for Cooperation in
Regulatory and Safety Matters, Mar. 18, 1976, United States-Korea, T.I.A.S. No.
8283.
's The Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environ-
ment was adopted unanimously by the U.N. Conference in Stockholm in June, 1972.
B. JOHNSON, supra note 58, at 21. The 27th Session of the U.N. General Assembly en-
dorsed the declaration in resolutions 2994-3004. 26 Y.B. U.N. 323 (1972).
94 26 Y.B. U.N. 325, 337 (1972).
9s Id. at 330.
96 Id.
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None of these resolutions specifically mention nuclear energy, but
each applies to the environmental dangers of the nuclear industry. For
instance, Resolution 2994 calling for action to preserve the environ-
ment calls forth the responsibility of states to safely transport and store
nuclear wastes in adequately shielded containers to reduce the risk of
radioactive contamination of the environment. And Resolution 2995,
providing that states must not produce harmful effects outside their
territories in the exploitation of their natural resources bears on the
responsibility of neighboring states to safely operate their respective
nuclear power plants to avoid core meltdowns or other plant accidents
that might release radioactivity across their borders.
These Resolutions are not backed by sanctions, but they do carry
weight by virtue of the fact that "[a] solemn declaration has a special
significance from the legal point of view. The Declaration on the
Human Environment will hopefully [sic] influence the actions of states
and the working out of treaty law." 97
Even if the Resolutions cause a significant change in international
environmental policies, however, they promise to have little impact
upon international solutions of the environmental problems associated
with nuclear energy. As just discussed, the Resolutions do apply to the
environmental dangers of nuclear energy use. But the dearth of provi-
sions in nuclear energy agreements relating to environmental hazards
and safety standards indicates that this aspect of nuclear energy use is
being ignored on the international level. If nations enter into
agreements to protect the environment pursuant to the Resolutions,
such agreements unfortunately will probably not confront the en-
vironmental hazards associated with nuclear energy use. 98
III. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
In dealing with the problem of possible diversion of nuclear energy
materials to weapons manufacture, the United States has chosen to try
to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons rather than to encourage the
91 B. JOHNSON, supra note 58, at 22. One such agreement made by the United
States since the passage of the Resolutions is the Agreement for Cooperation in En-
vironmental Affairs, May 9, 1974, United States-Federal Republic of Germany, 26
U.S.T. 840, T.I.A.S. No. 8069.
91 The Agreement for Cooperation in Environmental Affairs, supra note 97, for
example, does not mention nuclear energy nor the environmental problems associated
with it.
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expansion of a system of nuclear weapon counterbalances. To further
this goal, the United States has entered into a multi-layered series of
safeguards agreements to prevent the diversion of peaceful nuclear
energy materials to weapons manufacture. Today the solution to the
problem of diversion relies most heavily upon the NPT. 99
The method chosen to prevent weapons proliferation rests, in the
end, upon the simple promises exchanged by the parties to the NPT;
promises that those who have nuclear weapons will begin to dispose of
them, and that those who do not have nuclear weapons will not obtain
them through any means whatsoever. On the faith of these promises,
the parties to the NPT cooperate in developing and expanding, the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NPT provides a sufficiently at-
tractive balance of benefits both to nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-
weapon states to have attracted over 100 signatories. If the rest of the
nations of the world can be induced to sign the NPT, and if the IAEA
safeguards system operates efficiently and thoroughly, and if nuclear-
weapon-states do indeed begin to disarm, the NPT will prove an effec-
tive international solution to the problem of government diversion of
nuclear materials for military purposes.
It must be stressed that nuclear materials can be used for weapons
manufacture by terrorists as well as by governments, and this problem
has been completely ignored in international nuclear energy
agreements. It is incomprehensible that agreements have not been
made requiring protection of nuclear facilities and materials against
terrorist attack and theft. Such a dangerous problem is far too serious
to ignore. Agreements to implement protection systems against ter-
rorism should be implemented immediately.10 0
The economic pressures exerted upon the nuclear energy industry
have been partially relieved by the NPT. The NPT's guarantee of an
adequate nuclear energy supply to recipient nations will probably serve
to reduce their demands for facilities and materials capable of diver-
sion to military use. This in turn will decrease the pressure on supplier
nations to produce these facilities and materials for sale on the world
market.
The United States also has acted unilaterally to reduce economic
pressures on the nuclear industry, with the intent on influencing other
9' Nye, supra note 23, at 184.
100 It is highly unlikely that any country would refuse to sign and implement such
an agreement. A nuclear weapon in the hands of a terrorist group or other nongovern-
mental group would threaten the security of all nations.
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states' actions by setting an example.10' Several of these unilateral ac-
tions show an intent to deemphasize the competitive aspects of nuclear
energy use whenever competitive behavior might undermine non-
proliferation goals. The decisions to embargo the exportation of
enrichment and reprocessing facilities and to defer the commercial use
of breeder reactors in the face of market demands for these facilities
are evidence of such an intent. 0 2 Voluntary submission to a bilateral
safeguards agreement with the IAEA is further evidence. An interna-
tional nuclear fuel cycle evaluation conference was recently sponsored
by the United States in the hope that fuel cycles not involving
weapons-usable material would be developed and promoted by
representatives of governments participating in the world nuclear
energy market. '3 President Carter advocates the establishment of an
international nuclear fuel bank to provide for any country's peaceful
nuclear energy needs so that recipient nations will not feel compelled
to obtain facilities such as enrichment plants and fast breeder reactors
to provide for their energy security.10 4 The President would also like to
guarantee fuel supplies and provide for storage of spent fuel under
contracts with recipient nations. 0 5 These unilateral actions have had a
significant effect on international nuclear energy policies. Joseph Nye,
Jr. stated:
[W]e continue to embargo the export of sensitive facilities and
technologies, particularly enrichment and reprocessing, so as to delay
the spread of weapons-usable material and the facilities that produce
them. The new aspect here is that we have encouraged other supplier
nations to exercise similar restraint. We have achieved considerable
agreement among the 15 supplier countries that have met periodical-
ly in London since 1975. Less than two weeks ago the West German
1011n his message to the Congress on April 27, 1977, President Carter said, "The
domestic nuclear policies which I have already put forward will place our nation in a
leadership position, setting a positive example for other nuclear suppliers as well as
demonstrating the strength of our concern here at home .... Nuclear Nonprol#fera-
tion Policy Act of 1977 Transmitted to the Congress, 76 DEFT STATE BULL. 477, 477
(1977).
05 President Carter Announces Decisions on Nuclear Power Policy, supra note 22,
at 432.
"' Id. at 430; Organizing Conference of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Evaluation Meets in Washington, 77 DEPT STATE BULL. 659 (1977).
10' President Carter Announces Decisions on Nuclear Power Policy, supra note 22,
at 432.
105 Id.
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Government announced that it would not export reprocessing
technology in the future, thus joining France, the Soviet Union,
ourselves, and others in the policy of restraint. 06
The numerous agreements providing for cooperative research and ex-
changes of information on nuclear safety technology constitute small
steps toward solving the danger of environmental harm presented by
the nuclear industry. Considering the gravity of the risks involved, it is
clear that such agreements alone do not do enough. The results of the
research should be synthesized into safety standards imposed upon the
nuclear industry. All research information should be referred to a cen-
tral body which could organize the information into a system of safety
standards designed to minimize the risk of environmental damage dur-
ing every step of the nuclear fuel cycle. The IAEA is the obvious can-
didate to perform such a function. This plan is in fact provided for in
the Statute of the IAEA. 0 7 The United States should undertake to
promote agreements providing for application of uniform safety stan-
dards in cooperation with the IAEA.
An international danger protection and emergency assistance
system should also be implemented. Agreements under this system
should provide for radiation supervision, timely warnings to neighbor-
ing countries in the event of radiation danger, and international
emergency assistance after a reactor catastrophe. Such agreements
with Canada, Latin America and South America would be especially
important to the United States. 0 8
It cannot be overemphasized that even if all the protective systems
discussed above were implemented, nuclear energy would still pose
106 Nye, supra note 23.
"' Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, supra note 71, Art. III, A.
'08 Agreements concerning safety standards and warning systems are discussed in
the context of general international law in Pelzer, Legal Problems of International
Danger Protection and of International Emergency Assistance in the Event of Radia-
tion Accidents, in 3 PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY 451 (1972). In that article the
author states:
Provisions to encourage unification of licensing and supervision laws in the
contracting [treaty-making] states would be welcome. When the standards of
safety in the contracting states are homogeneous in content, not only will the
risks of an accident decrease but assistance teams will then move on familiar
ground, so to speak, at foreign installations, so that emergency assistance will
be less complicated and, therefore, more effective.
Id. at 463.
Vol. 10:671
NUCLEAR ENERGY TREA TIES
enormous insoluble problems. The risks of nuclear energy use are ex-
traordinary given the toxicity of the materials involved, the amounts in
which they are produced, and the length of time required for the pro-
ducts to become safe. Nuclear energy is not the best answer, nor even
a good answer, to the world's energy needs. The only adequate solu-
tion to the environmental problems of nuclear energy is abandonment
of the nuclear energy industry. The United States should expend every
effort to convince other nations to forsake the use of nuclear power
and substitute other energy alternatives. Said President Carter in ad-
dressing the Conference of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Evaluation: "I have a feeling that the need for atomic power itself for
peaceful uses has perhaps been greatly exaggerated and I hope that all
the nations represented here and others will assess alternatives to turn-
ing to this source of power. . ".09
ANN B. VOORHEES*
100 Organizing Conference of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation
Meets in Washington, supra note 103, at 660.
*J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University, 1979.
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APPENDIX
NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
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= danger of use for
weapons)
(+ danger of irradiation)
P- could be enriched to more
than 10% uranium-235 and
used to make explosive
weapons
i f either plutonium or highly
enriched uranium is used as
fuel, the fuel could be used
to make explosive weapons
+ fuel becomes radioactive as it is
used, and a core meltdown or
other accident could release it
into the atmosphere
a transportation accident
could release highly radioac-
tive spent fuel into the en-
vironment
t- separated plutonium could be
used to make explosive or
dispersal weapons
" spent fuel or separated wastes
could be used to make disper-
sal weapons
+ highly radioactive spent fuel
or separated wastes could ac-
cidentally be released into the
ennronment
+ spent fuel, stored without
Po reprocessing, will remain
radioactive for at least 250, 000
years, and could be acciden-
tally released into the en-
vironment or used to make
dispersal weapons
: wastes remaining after repro-
vo cessing, if stored alone will
remain radioactive for 600 to
1000 years, and could be
accidentally released into the
environment, or used to make
dispersal weapons
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